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NATIONAL COLLEGIA TEA THLETIC ASSOCIATION v. BOARD
OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
AND UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION
104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984)
SUSAN MARIE KOZIK*

Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act1 prohibits restraints of trade
that unreasonably restrict competition. 2 Two modes of analysis, 3 the
"Rule of Reason" 4 and the "per se rule" have been developed by courts
to determine whether a restraint of trade is unreasonable under the Act.
The Supreme Court, in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,6 appears to have continued to
narrow the distinction between the two modes of analysis; thereby making it difficult to anticipate which rule will be utilized in a particular
situation. This comment will focus on the Supreme Court's antitrust
analysis and will establish that the Court has continued the trend of
merging the Rule of Reason and the per se rule.
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:

A

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Rule of Reason is deemed "the traditional framework of analy* B.S. Journalism, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1981; candidate for J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law, January 1986
1. The Sherman Antitrust Act provides that "[elvery contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
2. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Section 1 prohibits only unreasonable restraints of trade. See, eg., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982);
National Soc'y of Professional Engrs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-90 (1978); Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 38
(1911).
3. In characterizing the modes of analysis, the Supreme Court has stated:
In the first category there are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality-they are illegal per se'. In the second category there are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history
of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
4. The Court first articulated the Rule of Reason in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 (1911). See infra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
6. 104 S.Ct. 2948 (1984).
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sis" under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 7 The Supreme Court
first announced the rule in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,8 where it
held that the Sherman Act outlawed only unreasonable restraints of
trade. 9 In Standard Oil, the Court held that although the business practices employed by the oil company appeared to be competitive and a restraint of trade,' 0 Congress did not intend to outlaw all restraints of
trade, only those which failed to pass under "the standard of reason".'
The parameters of the Rule of Reason were articulated seven years
2
later by the Supreme Court in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States.'
The Court in that decision stated that a restraint is reasonable if it merely
regulates and thereby promotes rather than inhibits competition.' 3 In
order to determine this, courts must consider factors such as the peculiar
characteristics of the business in which the restraint is imposed, the condition of the market before imposition of the restraint, the nature of the
restraint's effect, the reason for adopting the restraint and the purpose to
4
be attained by the restraint.'
The broad scope of the Rule of Reason analysis as articulated in
Chicago Board of Trade has been narrowed in recent years by the Court
which limited the basic inquiry under the Rule.15 In its decision of National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,1 6 the Court
7. Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
8. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
9. In Standard Oil, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and forty other defendants,
including 33 corporations and John D. Rockefeller, were accused of conspiring to restrain and monopolize trade and commerce in oil and other petroleum products. On appeal, the defendants argued that their business practices, which appeared to be anticompetitive, actually served to increase
the production of petroleum products, thereby lowering the price and bestowing a benefit upon the
public. 221 U.S. at 75. See also Kintner, I FEDERAL ANTrRUST LAW § 8.2 (1980).
10. 221 U.S. at 75.
11. As the Standard Oil court noted:
[Section 1 of the Act] necessarily called for the exercise of judgment which required that
some standard should be resorted to for the purpose of determining whether the prohibitions contained in the statute had or had not in any given case been violated. Thus not
specifying but indubitably contemplating and requiring a standard, it follows that it was
intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at the common law and in this
country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by the statute was intended to
be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether in a given case a particular act
had or had not brought about the wrong against which the statute provided.
221 U.S. at 60.
12. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
13. Id. at 238.
14. Id.
15. In Continental T.V. Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Court stated that
under the Rule of Reason, c all facts and circumstances must be weighed in determining whether a
restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint upon competition. Id. at 49. The test in Continental T V has been subsequently narrowed. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
16. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).

NCAA v. OKLAHOMA UNIVERSITY BOARD OF REGENTS

stated that the inquiry under the Rule of Reason is not merely whether a
restraint is reasonable in a particular context, but rather, the inquiry is
limited to whether the restraint is one which enhances competition or
suppresses competition.' 7 The inquiry therefore is limited to the market
impact of the practice on competition, which is determined by the practice's effect upon a relevant market.' 8
In contrast to the Rule of Reason, courts deem certain types of contracts and marketing arrangements per se unreasonable as a matter of law
in order to simplify and expedite antitrust analysis under the Sherman
Act.' 9 Among the categories of restraints deemed to be a per se violation
of the Sherman Act are horizontal price fixing, 20 bid rigging and market
division, 2 1 vertical price fixing, 22 group boycotts, 23 and tying arrange17. Id. at 691. See also Antitrust Law Developments (Second), American Bar Association, p.
20-21 (1984), for a good discussion on the development of analysis under the Rule of Reason.
18. A market has both product and geographic dimensions. See Antitrust Law Developments
(Second), supra note 17 at 17. At this point, it is important to note a related argument called the
single entity defense which has been raised many times in situations which are similar to that in
NCAA v. Board of Regents. The Sherman Antitrust Act does not apply to single entities. North
Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), arf'd in part,
rev'd in part, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (single entity defense raised against antitrust challenge to NFL rule prohibiting NFL owners from owning a team in another sport); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n
v. National Football League, 484 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd on othergrounds, 634 F.2d
1197 (9th Cir. 1980) (single entity defense used against an antitrust challenge to a NFL rule which
required approval of three-fourths of NFL owners before moving franchise); see Blecher, Daniels,
ProfessionalSports and the Single Entity Defense Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 4 WHITTIER L. REV. 217 (1982).

19. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (exclusive contract
between hospital and anesthesiologists). See also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332 (1982) (agreement between medical society and doctors); Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E.
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (franchising agreement between manufacturers and television set
retailers); United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (credit arrangement with
prefabricated housing manufacturer); Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495
(1969) (credit arrangement with prefabricated housing manufacturer); White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 262 (1963) (distributorship agreement); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (preferential routing clause in deeds and leases); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (newspaper advertising arrangement); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (exclusive gasoline, oil and auto supply contracts).
20. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (agreement fixed doctors'
fees); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (agreement between beer retailers only
to sell upon advance payment or on delivery); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons,
Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (liquor distiller's agreement to fix maximum resale price); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (gasoline and oil sales and purchases in spot markets);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (agreement to set price between bathroom fixture manufacturers).
21. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (exclusive dealing contract of cooperative buying association); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (bedding manufacture's
licensing arrangement and territory division); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
593 (1951) (territorial market divisions with foreign manufacturers).
22. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (manufacturer's territorial
limitations and distribution scheme); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (dealer
distributorship agreements restricting geographic territory).
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ments. 24 The roots of the per se analysis are also grounded in Standard
Oil Co. v. United States,25 in which the Court recognized that certain
agreements, such as rate fixing agreements, ended any further inquiry
under the Rule of Reason. Those arrangements gave rise to "a conclusive presumption which brings them [the agreements] within the
statute."

26

In the past five years, the distinction between the Rule of Reason
analysis and the per se analysis appears to have become blurred. In 1979,
the Court expanded the inquiry under the per se rule in its decision in
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc.27 In
Broadcast Music, a television network brought suit against a licensing
agency for composers, writers and publishers. 28 The network argued
that the agency's licensing arrangement amounted to a form of price fix29
ing which was a per se violation under the Sherman Act.
The Court held that although "price fixing" is generally considered
a per se violation of the Sherman Act, analysis under that doctrine must
go beyond the face of the alleged anticompetitive practice.3 0 The Court
stated that the inquiry must focus on whether the effect and the practice
facially threaten the "proper operation of our predominantly free-market
economy."' 3'

In a footnote,3 2 the Court stated:

[T]he scrutiny occasionally required under [the per se rule] must not
merely subsume the burdensome analysis required under the Rule of
Reason, or else we should apply the Rule of Reason from the start.
23. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (collaborative effort against
minority of dealers); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (concerted
refusal to deal with appliance dealer by manufacturers and distributors).
24. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (preferential routing clauses in
railroad deeds and leases); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S 594 (1953)
(tying arrangement found where newspaper required advertisers to buy equal space in morning and
evening newspapers).
25. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
26. 221 U.S. 1 at 65. The perse doctrine was expressly adopted by the Court in 1927, in United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). In Trenton Potteries,the defendants, a group of
bathroom and lavatory ceramics manufacturers, argued that an alleged price fixing scheme did not
constitute a violation of the Sherman Act, unless it could be found that interstate commerce was
unreasonably restrained by the Act. Id. at 397. Even though the scheme itself was reasonable, its
restraint effect upon competition was not. The Court reasoned that although a price fixing agreement was reasonably exercised, the effect was to eliminate competition which was a goal inherently
contradictory to the policies of the Sherman Act. Id. at 397-98.
27. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
28. The network argued that Broadcast Music Inc. violated antitrust laws by setting up and
receiving fees for a blanket licensing arrangement which allowed broadcasters to play copyrighted
musical compositions. 441 U.S. at 10.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. at 19-20.
31. Id. at 19.
32. Id. at 20, n. 33.
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That is why the per se rule is not employed until
33 after considerable
experience with the type of challenged restraint.
While the Court's decision in Broadcast Music served to ease the
harshness of antitrust analysis under the per se rule,34 its decision in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society35 appeared to narrow the application of the Rule of Reason analysis.3 6 In its decision, the Court stated
that per se rules were in effect a short cut; they were developed to eliminate unnecessary investigation of business practices in areas in which the
court has experience with the particular restraint involved that would
lead it to conclusively presume a restraint was unreasonable under the
Rule of Reason. 37 However, the Court stated that while per se analysis
was often convenient, its application was not always symmetrical. 38 For
the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency, the Court said that
it tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that a fullblown inquiry
might have proved to be reasonable.3 9 Therefore, it appears that the decision in Arizona v. Maricopa County failed to clarify when additional
evidence was necessary under either mode of analysis to determine
whether a practice violated the antitrust laws.
The distinction between the Rule of Reason and the per se rule grew
even murkier after the recent Court decision in Jefferson ParishHospital
District No. 2 v. Hyde.4° In that case, the Supreme Court reversed a
court of appeals ruling which held that an exclusive contract between a
hospital and a firm of anesthesiologists was a per se violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act. 4 1 In deciding that the controversial tying arrangement did not constitute a per se antitrust violation, the Court stated that
although a per se analysis was sometimes appropriate, there were situa42
tions in which a more detailed analysis was necessary.

33. See National Soc'y. of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690-92 (1978).
34. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 443 U.S. 36 (1977).
35. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
36. This case involved an antitrust challenge to a medical society which set the maximum fees
that doctors in the society could charge patients covered under particular insurance plans. The
Court held that the fee schedule amounted to a price fixing arrangement which was unlawful per se
under the Sherman Act, and that no additional investigation need be made into the facts and circumstances under which the plan was developed. 457 U.S. 357.
37. 457 U.S. at 342-43.
38. Id. at 344-45.
39. Id. at 345.
40. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
41. Id. at 1554.

42. The Court stated, "[A]pplication of the per se rule focuses on the probability of anticompetitive consequences. Of course, as a threshold matter there must be a substantial potential for impact
on competition in order to justify per se condemnation." Id. at 1560. The Court then said that only
after this threshold question was answered in the affirmative, can a per se rule be applied if an
anticompetitive effect is likely. Id.
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The Supreme Court decided Jefferson Parish Hospital only a few
months43 before its decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents. In NCAA v.
Board of Regents, the Court continued the trend of expanding analysis
under the per se rule while constricting the inquiry required under the
Rule of Reason.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is a nonprofit, voluntary consortium of approximately 850 colleges and universities.44 Since its inception in 1905, the NCAA has promulgated and
enforced playing rules, standards of amateurism and eligibility, and regulations concerning recruitment procedures, team composition and coaching staff size.45 Since 1951, the NCAA has also regulated the
46
broadcasting of football games on television.
In 1981, the NCAA entered into an agreement with the American
Broadcasting Company (ABC) and the Columbia Broadcasting System
(CBS) whereby each network would be granted exclusive carrying rights
of NCAA football games 47 for the 1982 through 1985 football seasons.
In return, each network agreed to pay the participating teams a "minimum aggregate compensation" which totaled $131,750,000.00 over the
four year period. 48 While the NCAA set a recommended fee for each
type of game broadcast, 49 each member school was authorized to negoti43. The Court decided Jefferson Parish Hosp. on March 27, 1984. The Court's decision in
NCAA v. Board of Regents was announced on June 27, 1984.
44. The purpose of the NCAA, as stated in its by-laws, is to maintain a "clear line of demarcation between college athletics and professional sports" by ensuring that student athletics remain an
integral part of the overall educational program. NCAA CONST., art. II, § 2(a). The NCAA,
through its control of intercollegiate sports seeks to maintain amateurism and promote the use of
athletics as a tool to further the educational and social development of students. See Note, Tackling
IntercollegiateAthletics, An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655, 657 n.9 (1978).
45. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct.
2948, 2954 (1984) [hereinafter cited as NCAA v. Board of Regents].
46. The 1951 plan provided that only one game a week could be broadcast in each region, with
a total blackout on 3 of 10 Saturdays during the season. A team could only appear on television
twice. The purpose of the plan was to protect live attendance at college football games and diminish
television's adverse impact upon college athletics. See Note, Tackling IntercollegiateAthletics, An
Antitrust Analysis, supra note 44. See also Garrett and Hochberg, Sports Broadcastingand the Law,
59 IND. L.J. 155 (1984).
47. The NCAA also granted exclusive cable broadcasting rights to Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. The minimum aggregate fee for the first two years of this contract was $17,696,000.00.
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2956, n.9, citing Board of Regents of the University of
Okla. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1291-92 (V.D. Okla. 1982).
48. Under this arrangement, national telecasts were the most valuable, regional telecasts less
valuable, and Division II and Division III games commanding even a lower price. The prices reflected the relative number of viewers for each type of game broadcast. NCAA v. Board of Regents,
104 S. Ct. at 2956.
49. Id. Also of interest is the fact that Division II and Division III institutions were allowed
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ate directly with the networks for the right to televise its games. In addition, the NCAA plan limited the number of television appearances each
football team could make during the four-year period. 50
The University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia along
with other NCAA members formed a group called the College Football
Association (CFA) 5 ' and sought to negotiate their own television broadcasting package with the National Broadcasting Company (NBC). 52 The
contract which CFA signed with NBC in 1981 gave those teams in the
CFA more television exposure than the NCAA plan and also increased
the anticipated compensation the teams were to receive. 53 The NCAA
threatened to impose sanctions upon the CFA teams if they proceeded
with their separate agreement with NBC. 54 In response, the Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia
Athletic Association55 sought an injunction against the NCAA that
would prevent it from taking disciplinary action or interfering with the
CFA's performance under the NBC contract. 56 A preliminary injunc57
tion was subsequently granted.
The district court, after a full trial, held that the NCAA violated
Sections 1 and 258 of the Sherman Antitrust Act in its regulation of televised football broadcast rights. 59 The district court found that the agreecomplete freedom to broadcast their games, with the limitation that the games, could not appear on
more than five stations without permission of the NCAA. Id. at 2956, n.8.
50. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2957. The four-year plan was split into two twoyear periods. The networks were under contract to provide coverage of at least 82 different universities during each two-year period. In addition, no member institution was allowed to appear more
than six times (four times nationally) and the appearances had to be divided equally among the two
networks. Id.
51. The CFA consists of 63 NCAA member universities and colleges. Board of Regents v.
NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1285 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
52. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2957.
53. Id.
54. Id. The threatened sanctions not only applied to football but extended to other sports as
well.
55. The University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia both have a long history of
having powerful (and popular) football teams. Both teams have also been highly ranked. Board of
Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1296, 1282 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
56. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2957.
57. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
58. For the text of Section 1, see supra note 1. Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits
the formation of monopolies:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the Court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents
found it unnecessary to discuss this issue.
59. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1301-28.
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ment between the NCAA and the networks restrained the relevant
market 6° in three ways: 1) the NCAA plan fixed prices for telecasts;
2) the exclusive network contract amounted to a boycott of all other
broadcasters and the threatened sanctions amounted to a threatened boycott of potential competitors; and 3) the plan placed an artificial limit on
the number of televised college football games. 6 1 The district court rejected the NCAA's contentions that the plan's television policies protected the gate attendance of its members, preserved a competitive
balance between the member schools and was therefore a justifiable re62
straint of trade.
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, 63 however,
it rejected its boycott holding. 64 The court found that the NCAA's television plan was not procompetitive, despite the proffered justifications. 6 5
The court rejected the argument that the television plan promoted live
attendance because it found that an increase in live attendance reduced
television viewership, thereby causing a decrease in output and was,
therefore, noncompetitive. 66 The court also rejected the argument that
the plan was reasonable because its purpose was to balance athletic competition between schools. 67 The court held that this goal was inherently
contradictory to the Sherman Antitrust Act's policy of encouraging and
68
not inhibiting competition.
The court of appeals also held that the NCAA's television plan was
illegal per se because it entirely eliminated competition between "producers" of televised college football games. 69 It summarily rejected the
NCAA's argument that the plan was competitively justified because of
the need to effectively compete against other types of television programming and entertainment. 70 The court further stated that even if the plan
was not illegal per se under the Sherman Act, the plan's limitations on
60.

The district court defined the relevant market as "live college football television" because

the court determined that alternative programming had a significantly different audience and appeal.
Id. at 1297-1300. The definition of the relevant market has an important significance upon the
application of antitrust laws in this particular case. See infra notes 116-122 and accompanying text.
61. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1293-95.
62. Id. at 1295-96.
63. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 707 F.2d
1147 (10th Cir. 1983).
64. Id. at 1160-61.
65. Id. at 1159-60.
66. Id. at 1153-54.
67. Id. at 1154.
68. Id. The court held that this argument amounted to the contention that "competition will
destroy the market" which is contradictory to the goal of the Sherman Act, which is to encourage
competition. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
69. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1155-56.
70. Id. at 1160.
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price and output were not justified by any procompetitive purpose even
when taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration. 7 1 The
NCAA subsequently appealed the circuit court's ruling, and the Supreme
72
Court granted certiorari.
THE COURT'S DECISION:

NCAA v. BOARD

OF REGENTS

Before determining whether the NCAA's television plan violated
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 73 the Court first decided which test to employ in its examination of the NCAA's plan. The Court found, as had
the district court, that the NCAA plan created among member institutions a horizontal restraint that controlled the way in which they could
compete with one another.74 Although the Court recognized that such a
horizontal restraint, which included an element of price fixing, 75 was
generally illegal per se, the Court determined that the per se antitrust
analysis was inappropriate in this case because the restraints on competition were necessary if the product, televised college football, was to be
76
available at all.
The Court reinforced its decision to apply the Rule of Reason by
stating that because the product, college football, was unique in that it
was identified with an academic tradition, some regulations and agreements among the individual competitors were necessary in order to preserve the integrity of the product. 77 By promulgating rules and
71. The case was remanded to district court for appropriate modification of the injunction. Id.
at 1162.
72. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948
(1984). Prior to granting certiorari, the Supreme Court granted a temporary stay of the court of
appeals and district court rulings. 463 U.S. 1311 (1983). This stay allowed the NCAA television
plan to remain in effect for the 1983 football season.
73. It is important to note that football, baseball, basketball and hockey leagues are permitted
to pool broadcasting rights without fear of prosecution under antitrust laws. This exemption is
granted by the Sports Broadcast Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-95 (1982). The Act does not grant
exemptions to intercollegiate athletics. 15 U.S.C. § 1293.
74. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 104 S.Ct. 2948,
2959. The Court stated that the NCAA consisted of schools that competed against each other for
fans and revenue. With this conclusion, the Court in effect affirmed the lower court's finding that
the relevant market was televised college football.
75. Id. at 2960. The district court determined that the NCAA's "recommended price" operated in effect to preclude any negotiations as to amount paid per broadcast. Board of Regents v.
NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1291.
76. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 104 S.Ct. at 2960-61. The Court also noted that "[w]hile as
the guardian of an important American tradition, the NCAA's motive must be accorded a respectful
presumption of validity, it is nevertheless well-settled that good motives will not validate an otherwise anticompetitive practice." Id. at 2960 n.23.
77. Id. at 2966. See also Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 735 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (challenge to NCAA's formerly all-male dues
policy and proceed distribution formula); Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 564 F.2d
1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (NCAA rules regarding coaching staff size held valid); Justice v. National
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regulations, the Court found that the NCAA performed a service which
actually expanded the choice available to both consumers (the sports fan)
and the athletes, and hence could be viewed as procompetitive. 7s In determining whether the controversial television plan achieved those goals,
the Court noted that the inquiry, which was the same under both rules,
79
was whether the challenged restraint enhanced competition.
THE MAJORITY'S REASONING

After deciding which rule to apply, the Court turned to an examination of the NCAA's justifications for the apparent anticompetitive effect8 0 of the television plan. The NCAA argued that the plan could have
no anticompetitive effect because it had no market power through which
it could alter the interaction of supply and demand.8 In rejecting this
argument, the Court stated that as a matter of law, absence of market
power does not justify a naked restraint on price and output; 82 price and
supply must still be responsive to consumer demand. 83 It was also found,
as a matter of fact, that the NCAA possessed market power, in that it
controlled a separate unique market-college football broadcasts-which
attracted a unique audience that would not be drawn to other forms of
84
entertainment.
The NCAA's argument, that its plan was the result of a joint venture agreement between the individual members, and therefore was
procompetitive because it assisted in the marketing of broadcast rights,
was also rejected.8 5 The NCAA's plan was distinguished from the licensing arrangement in Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting86 because the Court found that the NCAA's plan did not create a new
product, it merely assured that the same product (broadcast rights) was
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983) (sanctions on basis of violation of
NCAA rules not a violation of antitrust laws or constitution); Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n., 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
78. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 104 S.Ct. at 2961.
79. Id. at 2962.
80. The Court determined that the NCAA's plan was apparently anticompetitive because it
raised prices, limited output and was unresponsive to consumer demand. Id.
81. Market power is also defined as the ability to raise prices above what would be charged in a
competitive market. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S.Ct. 1551, 1556 n.16 (1984);
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977); United States v. E.I. duPont
de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
82. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2965.
83. Id.
84. The Court found, as had the district court, that the audience was unique in demographics
as well. Id. at 2966.
85. Id. at 2967.
86. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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sold in a noncompetitive market.8 7 The Court stated that if the NCAA's
television plan indeed produced procompetitive efficiencies, the plan
would have increased output and reduced the price of broadcast rights to
televised games 88 The conclusion reached by the Court was that because
no individual school was permitted to broadcast its own games without
restraint, production was therefore limited, which was an anticompetitive
89
result.
The NCAA's argument, that the television plan protected live attendance at games, was addressed next. The majority doubted that this
claim was in fact true because the games were broadcast at the same time
they were played. 90 It was also noted that the NCAA's argument appeared to be based on the fear that "the product will not prove sufficiently attractive to draw live attendance when faced with competition
from televised games." 9' The Court held that this justification is therefore inconsistent with the policies of the Sherman Act because the Rule
of Reason does not support the defense that competition itself is unreasonable. 92 Finally, the Court rejected the NCAA's contention that the
plan was necessary to maintain a competitive balance between member
schools. 93 It found that this justification was not related to any neutral
standard and that there was no evidence that the plan was tailored to
94
serve such an interest.
THE DISSENT'S REASONING

In his dissent,95 Justice White 96 stated that the Court erred in treating intercollegiate football as a "purely commercial venture" and ignoring the NCAA's interests in preserving amateurism and integrating
athletics and education. 97 Justice White stated that although the district
court and the Supreme Court correctly chose the Rule of Reason test,
87. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2967.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2969.
91. Id.
92. Id., citing National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
93. Board of Regents v. NCAA, at 2970.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2971-79 (white, and Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting).
96. It is interesting to note that Justice White, prior to his distinguished career on the bench,
enjoyed a distinguished football career as well. In 1937, Justice White (who was known then as
"Whizzer White") led the nation in rushing for the University of Colorado and was named an AllAmerican. In 1938, Justice White played professional football for the Pittsburgh Pirates (the predecessors of the Steelers) and was voted NFL rookie of the year. See B. Woodward and S. Armstrong,
THE BRETHREN 65 (1979).
97. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 104 S.Ct. at 2973.
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they employed the wrong measure of output. 98 Under the plan, Justice
White pointed out, total viewership is actually increased by expanding
national network coverage at the expense of limiting the number of local
broadcasts. Justice White also argued that the plan created a new product, exclusive television rights, which were more valuable and therefore
commanded a higher price than the individual schools, marketing their
products, could demand. 99 This, in White's opinion, was not an anticompetitive rise in price.
Justice White further argued that the redistribution of revenues was
necessary to maintain a system of "truly competitive teams."'0 In addition, Justice White contended that the plan passed muster under the Rule
of Reason. Although he agreed with the majority that intercollegiate
football was a unique product, Justice White criticized the majority's failure to recognize that the NCAA's television plan, as a joint venture,
helped college football as a whole to compete with other forms of entertainment.10 In that respect, Justice White concluded that the plan
merely regulated and thereby promoted competition.102
Finally, Justice White reiterated what he found to be the majority's
main error in its decision-the failure to recognize the legitimate noneconomic goals of the NCAA and its members.10 3 Justice White stated,
"[W]hen these values are factored into the balance, the NCAA's television plan seems eminently reasonable."'0 4 For these reasons, Justice
White concluded that at the very least, the district court's injunction be
vacated and the NCAA be allowed to regulate its member's football
game broadcasts. °5
ANALYSIS

Although the Court purported to apply the Rule of Reason analysis
in its decision, it actually applied a narrower test which approached the
mode of analysis used under the per se rule. Instead of determining
whether the net effect10 6 of the challenged restraint enhanced competition, the Court instead concentrated only on output and price, thereby
98. Id. Essentially, Justice white argued that if the number of televised games were to increase,
viewership would either decrease or remain the same.
99. Id. at 2976.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2977.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2978.
105. Id. at 2979.
106. See North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1261 (2d Cir.
1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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10
concluding the television plan was anticompetitive.
Although inquiry under the modem interpretation of the Rule of
Reason is limited to the competitive impact of the challenged restraint,10o
various other factors, such as market power, 1°9 effect of the restraint
upon competitive market conditions 10 and the nature of the restraint11'
must be considered before an evaluation of the competitive impact of the
practice can be made. 11 2 While the Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents
attempted to discuss each of these factors in detail, it failed to go on to
the next step and evaluate, as a whole, what relevance these factors have
on competition. Instead, the Court refrained from any further analysis of
these factors, and chose to conclude, simplistically, that the plan was not
procompetitive because it limited output and raised prices. 113
This Rule of Reason analysis appears to suspiciously resemble the
per se analysis used in Arizona v. Maricopa County.114 The Court even
alluded to the fact that its reasoning under the Rule of Reason was similar to reasoning under the per se rule. In a footnote, the Court stated,
"[I]ndeed there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of
Reason analysis. Perse rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct."' 1 5 Utilizing this interpretation of the Rule of Reason in
NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Court seems to be continuing a trend of
attempting to merge the two lines of analyses.
The Court, in considering the NCAA's justification for the apparent
anticompetitive effects of the television plan, also relied too heavily upon
the district court findings in regard to its interpretation of the relevant
market. Under a Rule of Reason analysis, it is imperative to determine
the relevant market correctly before determining the effects of a challenged restraint upon it. 116 The Court accepted the district court's find107. Some restraints are so restrictive on their face that further analysis is unnecessary. See, e.g.,
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977). However, the Court determined that it was necessary to examine the procompetitive justifications in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S.Ct. 2948 (1984).
108. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
109. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S.Ct. 1551, 1566 (1984).
110. Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
111. Id.
112. Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972); Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976).
113. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S.Ct. at 2967.
114. 457 U.S. 332 (1982). See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
115. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S.Ct. at 2962 n.26.
116. See Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 17 at 16.
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ing that college football broadcasts constitute a separate market because
11 7
there is no available substitute for televised college football games.
The district court based its conclusion on statistics which showed that
the demographics of an audience that watched college football games was
unique and, consequently, the court concluded that advertisers would
pay a premium price to reach this audience. 1 8
In accepting the district court's findings, the Court ignored the role
of televised college football in an entertainment market." 9 As the dissent pointed out, the NCAA has no monopoly power when it is viewed
as a competitor against other forms of entertainment. 120 Justice White
stated, "[I]t is one thing to say that 'NCAA football is a unique product'. . . . It is quite another.., to say that maintenance or enhancement
of the quality of NCAA football telecasts is unnecessary to enable those
21
telecasts to compete effectively against other forms of entertainment."'
It appears that the Court, by overlooking the role college football played
as a competitor in the entertainment market, failed to thoroughly examine the market impact of the NCAA's plan as required under a traditional Rule of Reason approach.122
It also appears that the Court failed to adequately distinguish the
NCAA's television plan from the blanket licensing arrangement for musical compositions in BroadcastMusic. 23 The Court in BroadcastMusic
held that the licensing arrangement did not violate antitrust laws because
it created a "different product" that allowed for the effective marketing
of a product that otherwise would be unavailable. 2 4 The Court stated
that the NCAA's television plan differed from the permissible arrangement in BroadcastMusic because it did not "make possible a new product by reaping otherwise unattainable efficiencies."' 12 5 Rather, the
NCAA's plan, merely sold the same rights in a non-competitive market. 126 It was also found that unlike the plan in Broadcast Music, the
television plan limited output and increased the price of televised
games,' 27 and was therefore anticompetitive.
117. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2961 (1984).
118. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1297-98, passim.
119. See North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
120. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2977 (White, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978).
123. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
124. Id. at 22.
125. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2967, citing, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
126. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2967.
127. Id.
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The Court, however, overlooked the persuasiveness of the argument
that the NCAA's plan, as did the plan in BroadcastMusic, created a new
product. It can be effectively argued that the NCAA's plan created a
new product of exclusive television rights. The fact that the NCAA's
plan resulted in higher prices for these exclusive rights was not indicative
of the plan's anticompetitive nature.1 28 The Court indicated in Broadcast
Music that joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements were not
usually unlawful, at least not as price-fixing schemes, where the agreement on price was necessary in order to market the product. 29 The
Court recognized in NCAA v. Board of Regents that some degree of cooperation was necessary if the market was to be preserved.130 However, the
conclusion that the NCAA plan was anticompetitive' 3 l ignored the argument that the limit on the number of televised games and price restrictions enhanced the quality of the product produced, and thereby
32
potentially increased viewership.
Finally, the Court's argument that the restraints imposed by the
NCAA were not necessary to preserve the market and to make the product available appears to be internally inconsistent. The majority recognized that some horizontal restraints 133 were necessary in order to
preserve the amateur character of intercollegiate sports. It has been decided many times in the past that NCAA regulations concerning eligibility, 3 4 recruiting, 35 coaching contracts 136 and standards of
amateurism 137 do not violate antitrust laws. 138 However, while the majority maintained that these type of regulations were procompetitive, it
failed to adequately distinguish why the regulations concerning television
broadcasting rights do not pass muster under antitrust laws. Although
these non-economic types of restrictions also arguably had the effect of
limiting output by placing restraints on competition, 39 the Court appeared to apply a different standard in considering the legality of the
NCAA's noneconomic regulations than it did when considering the
NCAA's broadcast plan.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
League,
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See id. at 2976.
Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23.
Board of Regents v. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2969.
Id. at 2970.
Id. at 2976 (White, J., dissenting). See also National Football League v. North Am. Soccer
459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2961.
Kupec v. Atlantic Coast Conference, 399 F. Supp. 1377 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
See Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F. Supp. 356, 379 (D. Ariz. 1983).
Hennessy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
See supra note 77.
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2976 (White, J., dissenting).
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In analyzing the possible procompetitive effects of the NCAA's
plan, the Court failed to adequately discuss, in its Rule of Reason analysis, the noneconomic justifications for the limitations on output and
price. The fact that the NCAA is a not-for-profit organization was not
taken into consideration. The characterization of the NCAA as a notfor-profit educational institution as opposed to a business entity, while
not determinative, is relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act.'14 One of the most persuasive arguments made by the NCAA was that the plan maintains the competitive
balance between teams by spreading television revenues among strong
and weak teams alike1 4 ' thereby fostering the goal of amateurism by reducing financial incentives. The Court rejected this argument by stating
that the notion that "competition itself is unreasonable" is inconsistent
with the goals of the Sherman Act. 42 What may be true in a business
setting may not necessarily be true when a not-for-profit organization is
involved. By failing to take into consideration the NCAA's non-economic goals, the Court failed to utilize the full scope of the inquiry available under the Rule of Reason.
CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents leaves the
NCAA's member colleges and universities scrambling for television
rights and broadcast dollars. Although the big winner in this process is
the college football fan, in that the number of college football games televised has increased substantially, the schools in the end may suffer. The
immediate losers will be the schools with weaker football teams and
those smaller schools in Divisions II and III. According to recent reports, total television revenues for intercollegiate football for the 1984
season are expected to be much lower than the original estimates. This
drop in revenues may result in a realization of the fears expressed in
Justice White's dissent-that uninhibited competition will undermine the
NCAA's goals of preserving amateurism and promoting athletics within
43
the educational system.
The Court's decision creates other problems as well. Legal disputes
140. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, Colo., 455 U.S. 40 (1982); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
141. The NCAA also distributes the revenues it earns from its television plan to Division II and
Division III teams to help maintain their programs and also to fund other sports and tournaments.
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2970 (1984).
142. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2969.
143. Id. at 2978 (White, J., dissenting).
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have already arisen over which of two teams, meeting on the playing field
with conflicting television contracts, have the right to broadcast the
game. 144 The decision also leaves the NCAA in the dark as to the legality of its non-economic regulations in the areas of eligibility, recruiting
and others. It appears that although the Court approved of these types
of regulations, a valid argument can be made based on NCAA v. Board of
Regents that these restrictions limit output and raise prices and therefore
violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
In a broader sense, the Court's decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents appears to further merge the doctrines of per se and Rule of Reason
antitrust analysis. Although the Court goes beyond the face of the restraints imposed by the NCAA, it failed to fully examine the procompetitive justifications as required under a traditional Rule of Reason
approach. It appears that the Court in this decision is continuing a trend
toward combining the two methods of analysis into one rule.

144. See Chicago Tribune, Sept. 10, 1984. § 3, at 1.

